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Abstract
Security of machine learning is increasingly becoming a ma-
jor concern due to the ubiquitous deployment of deep learning
in many security-sensitive domains. Many prior studies have
shown external attacks such as adversarial examples that tam-
per the integrity of DNNs using maliciously crafted inputs.
However, the security implication of internal threats (i.e.,
hardware vulnerability) to DNN models has not yet been well
understood.
In this paper, we demonstrate the first hardware-based at-
tack on quantized deep neural networks–DeepHammer–that
deterministically induces bit flips in model weights to com-
promise DNN inference by exploiting the rowhammer vul-
nerability. DeepHammer performs aggressive bit search in
the DNN model to identify the most vulnerable weight bits
that are flippable under system constraints. To trigger de-
terministic bit flips across multiple pages within reasonable
amount of time, we develop novel system-level techniques
that enable fast deployment of victim pages, memory-efficient
rowhammering and precise flipping of targeted bits. Deep-
Hammer can deliberately degrade the inference accuracy of
the victim DNN system to a level that is only as good as
random guess, thus completely depleting the intelligence of
targeted DNN systems. We systematically demonstrate our
attacks on real systems against 12 DNN architectures with
4 different datasets and different application domains. Our
evaluation shows that DeepHammer is able to successfully
tamper DNN inference behavior at run-time within a few min-
utes. We further discuss several mitigation techniques from
both algorithm and system levels to protect DNNs against
such attacks. Our work highlights the need to incorporate se-
curity mechanisms in future deep learning system to enhance
the robustness of DNN against hardware-based deterministic
fault injections.
1 Introduction
Machine learning services are rapidly gaining popularity in
several computing domains due to the tremendous advance-
ments of deep learning in recent years. Because of the un-
paralleled performance, deep neural networks (DNNs) are
widely used nowadays in many decision-making tasks includ-
ing access control [11, 17, 19, 29, 63], malware detection [69],
medical diagnostics [49] and autonomous driving [8,55]. With
such ever-increasing interaction between intelligent agents
and human activities that are security and safety critical, main-
taining security objectives (e.g., confidentiality, integrity) is
the first-order design consideration for DNN systems [51].
While considerable attention has been focused on protect-
ing DNN against input-based external adversaries (e.g., adver-
sarial examples and data poisoning attacks [3, 7, 42, 62]), we
note that internal adversaries that leverage vulnerability of
commercial-off-the-shelf hardware is a rapidly rising security
concern [6]. Recent development of fault injection threats
(e.g., rowhammer attack [27]) can successfully compromise
the integrity of data belonging to a victim process, which
can lead to catastrophic system breach such as privilege es-
calation [48]. These hardware-based attacks are extremely
worrisome since they are capable of directly tampering the
internal state of a target system. In light of the power of the
hardware-based threat, we note that understanding its security
implication in deep learning systems is imperative.
Recently Hong et al. [21] have shown that single-bit corrup-
tions in DNN model parameters can considerably degrade the
inference accuracy of several DNN models. Their attack study
is performed on full-precision (i.e., floating-point numbers)
DNN models where a single bit flip in the exponent field (i.e.,
the most-significant bit) of a parameter can result in orders of
magnitude change in the parameter value. Note that quantized
deep neural networks [23], on the other hand, are more robust
to single-bit corruption. This is because model quantization
replaces full-precision model parameters with low bit-width
integer or even binary representation, which significantly lim-
its the magnitude of possible parameter value range [22,70].
Our initial investigation aligns with this observation in [21]
that single bit flip in quantized model weights does not intro-
duce any observable accuracy loss for 99% of the time. Due
to the impressive improvement in energy efficiency, memory
footprints and storage, model quantization is now the de facto
optimization in deep neural networks [71]. Yet it remains un-
certain whether a successful rowhammer attack on quantized
neural network is possible.
In this paper, we present a new class of DNN model fault
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injection attack called DeepHammer that targets quantized
deep neural networks. DeepHammer flips a small set of tar-
geted bits to precisely degrade the prediction accuracy of the
target model to the level of random guess. We systemically
characterize how bit flips of model parameters can influence
the accuracy of a well-trained quantized deep neural networks.
Our study focuses on model weights as these are the major
components of DNN model with most substantial impact on
DNN performance. Our findings indicate that to carry out a
successful fault injection attack, multiple bit flips spanning
many layers of the model are required. This can be extremely
more difficult as compared to previous rowhammer exploits
due to major algorithmic and system-level challenges.
The first challenge involves designing an effective bit
search algorithm that understands system constraints and
minimizes the number of bit flips at the same time. This
is necessary because flipping a certain combination of bits
may not be possible if the DRAM profile of flippable loca-
tions does not allow. Furthermore, even if multiple bit flips
are attainable, the attack is unlikely to succeed if the targeted
bits in the model are simply numerous. In other words, the
targeted bits in model weights should be as few as possible.
The second challenge lies in developing an efficient rowham-
mer attack that could successfully flip multiple bits within
a reasonable exploitation window. We note that even with
very small number of bits to flip, the exploitation can still be
unreasonably long. In fact, Gruss et al. have recently shown
that a single bit flip in the victim’s memory can take a few
days to accomplish [13]. As the disturbance errors in DRAM
are transient, shortening the exploitation window for multi-bit
flips is critical since the flipped bits generally do not persist
after a memory reset or system reboot.
To tackle the first challenge, we propose a bit search method
to perform bit-wise gradient ranking combined with progres-
sive search to find the least amount of vulnerable bits that are
most influential in the targeted model. Since the generated
bit locations may not be empirically flipped, we implement
a flip-aware search technique that takes into account several
system constraints relating to victim’s memory layout and
target DRAM bit flip profile. The bit search process generates
a chain of targeted bits and ensures that these bits can be phys-
ically flipped in the target machine. If the chain of bits are all
flipped, the attacker could eventually compromise the target
model. Importantly, we find that the bit chain is not unique for
each model, and our search algorithm can potentially generate
many distinct bit chains to implement the attack.
DeepHammer addresses the second challenge by develop-
ing a new rowhammer attack framework with several novel
enhancement techniques. Our attack implementation enables
hammering of a sequence of target bits. Additionally, we
observe that to achieve the desired accuracy loss, attacker
needs to precisely flip the desired bits. That is, flipping extra
bits besides the targeted chain of bits surprisingly alleviates
accuracy loss. Therefore, a native approach of probabilistic
row hammering would not suffice. DeepHammer incorporates
three advanced attack techniques to enable fast and precise
row hammering: 1) advanced memory massaging that takes
advantage of per-cpu free page list for swift vulnerable page
relocation. This allows an order of magnitude faster page relo-
cation as compared to the state-of-the-art memory waylaying
approach [21], 2) precise double-sided rowhammering using
targeted column-page-stripe data pattern to guarantee exact
(i.e., no more and no less) bit flips in the victim DNN model;
3) online memory re-templating to update obsolete bit flip
profile. The combined rowhammer attack techniques can suc-
cessfully induce bit errors in the target locations that lead to
the attacker-desired accuracy loss.
In summary, we make the following key contributions:
• We highlight that multiple deterministic bit flips are re-
quired to attack quantized DNNs. An efficient flip-aware
bit search technique is proposed that identifies the most
vulnerable model bits to flip. The search algorithm mod-
els system constraints to ensure that the identified bits
can be flipped empirically.
• We develop a new rowhammer attack framework tailored
for inducing bit flips in DNN models. To achieve the
desired accuracy loss and have a reasonable exploitation
window, our attack employs several novel enhancement
techniques to enable fast and precise bit flips.
• We implement an end-to-end DeepHammer attack by
putting the aforementioned techniques together. We eval-
uate our attacks on 12 DNN architectures with 4 datasets
spanning image classification and speed recognition do-
mains. The results show that the attacker only needs to
flip between 2-24 bits (out of millions of model weight
parameters) to completely compromise the DNN model.
DeepHammer is able to successfully attack the targeted
chain of bits in minutes.
• We evaluate the effectiveness of DeepHammer with
single-side rowhammer method and using DRAM con-
figurations with a wide spectrum of bit flip vulnerability
levels. Our results show that DeepHammer can still suc-
ceed under most of such configurations.
• We investigate and evaluate mitigation techniques to
systematically protect targeted, multi-bit fault injection
attacks for quantized neural networks via DeepHam-
mer. Our work calls for algorithmic and system-level
techniques to enhance the robustness of deep learning
systems against hardware-based threats.
2 Background
In this section, we present the background related to the pro-
posed work in this paper including deep neural networks,
DRAM organizations, and rowhammer attacks.
Deep neural networks. DNNs have been shown to be very
efficient in many modern machine learning tasks. A typical
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deep neural network consists of a multi-layered structure in-
cluding input layers, many hidden layers and one output layer.
Essentially, deep neural networks are configured to approxi-
mate a function through a training process using a labeled data
set. Training a DNN model involves forward- and backward-
propagation to tune DNN parameters (such as model weights)
with the objective of minimizing prediction errors. Due to the
existence of large number of parameters in DNN models and
the enormous computation with respect to parameter tuning,
the training procedure can be extremely time- and resource-
consuming. Moreover, well-trained DNN models generally
need large amount of training data that may not be always
accessible. Therefore, to expedite the process of deployment,
developers tend to utilize pre-trained models released by third
parties (e.g., ModelZoo [1]).
Recent years, there are many advancements towards gener-
ating efficient and compact deep neural networks through
various compression techniques such as network pruning
and quantization [25, 71]. Notably, quantization replaces full-
precision DNN models with low-width or even binarized pa-
rameters that can significantly improve the speed and power
efficiency of DNN inference without adversely sacrificing ac-
curacy [15,23]. Consequently, model quantization techniques
have been used widely in deep learning systems, especially
for resource-constrained applications [14].
Rowhammer attacks. Rowhammer is a class of fault injec-
tion attacks that exploits DRAM disturbance errors. Specifi-
cally, it has been shown that frequent accesses on one DRAM
row (i.e., activation) will lead to toggling of voltage on DRAM
word-lines. This amplifies inter-cell coupling effects, leading
to quicker leakage of capacitor charge [27]. If sufficient charge
is leaked before the next scheduled refresh, the memory cell
will eventually lose its state, and a bit flip is induced. By
carefully selecting neighboring rows (aggressor rows) and
performing frequent row activations, an adversary can man-
age to modify some critical bits without access permissions
(e.g., kernel memory or data in other address spaces). To trig-
ger bit flips, there are mainly three hammering techniques: 1)
single-sided rowhammer manifests by accessing one row that
is adjacent to the victim row [48]; 2) double-sided rowham-
mer alternatively accesses two adjacent rows to the victim
row [30, 45, 48]; 3) one-location hammering that accesses
only one location in one row repeatedly to attack the target
row [13]. Double-sided rowhammer attack typically generates
most bit flips as it introduces the strongest cross-talk effect
for memory cells in the target row [27].
3 Threat Model and Assumptions
Our attack targets modern DNNs that are quantized where
model parameters are in the form of low bit-width integer
numbers (i.e., 8-bit). The adversary manages to trigger DNN
model bit flips in DRAM after the victim models are deployed
for inference. This is different from prior attacks that inject
stealthy payloads to the DNN model and re-distribute it to
victim users (e.g., DNN trojaning attacks [38]). We assume
that the deep neural network is setup on a resource-sharing
environment to offer ML inference service. Such applica-
tion paradigm is becoming popular due to the prevalence of
machine-learning-as-a-service (MLaaS) platforms [46].
The objective of attacker is to compromise DNN inference
behavior through inducing deterministic errors in the model
weights by exploiting the rowhammer vulnerability in DRAM.
Our attack aims to drastically degrade the inference accuracy
of the target DNN models. The attack is regarded as success-
ful if inference accuracy is close to random guess after the
exploitation. We note that while adversarial inputs [7, 42]
can also influence inference accuracy, our attack is funda-
mentally different: While adversarial inputs only target miss-
classification for specially crafted malicious inputs, our attack
aims to degrade the overall inference accuracy for legitimate
inputs.
We assume that the attacker is aware of the model parame-
ters in the target deep learning systems. Particularly the model
weight parameters are known to the attacker. Such assumption
is legitimate due to two main reasons: 1) As training process is
typically expensive, deploying machine learning service using
publicly available pre-trained models is the trending practice;
2) Even for private models, it is possible for adversaries to
gain knowledge of model parameters through various form of
information leakage attacks (e.g, power, electromagnetic and
microarchitecture side channels [2, 12, 64–68]).
The attacker is co-located with the victim DNN service,
and can run user-space unprivileged processes. Additionally,
it can map pages in the weight file to its own address space in
read-only mode. To map virtual address to physical address,
the attacker can take advantage of huge page support. If such
support is not available in the system, the attacker can leverage
hardware-based side channels [13] or use advanced memory
massaging techniques [30]. In this work, we mainly harness
double-sided rowhammer technique as it has been shown to be
most effective in inducing bit flips. Double-sided rowhammer
relies on a settlement of two adjacent rows to the victim row,
and thus requires knowledge of DRAM addressing scheme,
which could be obtained through reverse engineering [43]. We
assume that proper software-level confinement policies (e.g.,
process isolation) are in place. We further assume that the
operating system and hypervisor are benign and up-to-date,
and kernel protection mechanisms (e.g., [4]) are employed
to guard kernel data structures (e.g., page tables) against full
system exploitation. Such assumptions are aligned with recent
rowhammer exploitations (e.g., [13, 21, 30]).
4 DeepHammer Overview
In this section, we present an overview of our DeepHammer
attack approach. The attack has two off-line steps and one
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on-line step. The first off-line step is memory templating
phase that finds vulnerable bit offsets in a set of physical
pages. In the second off-line step, DeepHammer runs a flip-
aware bit search algorithm to find the minimal set of bits to
target. During the online phase, DeepHammer locates the
pages containing exploitable bits and trigger multiple bit flips
using several advanced rowhammer techniques.
DRAM bit flip profiling. In order to deterministically trigger
bit flips in the target DNN model, the first step is to scan the
memory for bit locations that are susceptible to bit flips. This
process is also called memory templating [45], which is typi-
cally considered an offline preparation step. For double-sided
rowhammering, the attacker has to understand the physical
address to row mapping scheme. We reverse-engineer the
DRAM addressing schemes for several different hardware
configurations using technique proposed in [43]. Since the
profiling is performed in the attacker’s own memory space, it
does not affect the normal operation of the underlying system.
The memory templating phase generates a list of physical
pages (identified by page frame numbers) together with vul-
nerable bit offset in page, flip direction (1!0 or 0!1) and
the probability of observing bit flip.
Vulnerable bit search in DNN model. We develop a flip-
aware bit search technique that takes as input the bit flip
profile generated in the profiling stage. Our algorithm aims to
locate the least number of bits (i.e., the least number of physi-
cal pages) to attack in order to yield the desired accuracy loss
(i.e. accuracy close to random guess in this work). The pro-
posed technique consists of two major components: Gradient
based Bit Ranking (GBR) and Flip-aware Bit Search (FBS).
It performs aggressive search using bit-wise gradient ranking.
The search technique ranks the influence of model weight bits
in the target DNN model based on gradient. It then employs
flip-aware search which identifies the most vulnerable bits
that are flppable and minimize the number of necessary flips.
Missing one target bit or flipping a bit at a wrong location
may significantly deteriorate the attack outcome. We found
that it is extremely important to consider system constraints
to guarantee the identified bits could be flipped empirically.
For instance, multiple bits could map to several weight param-
eters in the same virtual 4KB boundary, which could make it
impossible to find a satisfactory physical page. To ensure that
the vulnerable bits found could be flipped through rowham-
mer, the algorithm searches through flippable page offsets
based on the DRAM bit flip profile. To enhance the success
rate of relocating the target page (that has the target bit), we
further optimize the search algorithm by prioritizing model
weight bits which have higher number of candidate physical
locations.
Fast and precise bits flipping using rowhammer. The on-
line exploitation phase launches rowhammer attack to flip the
chain of bits identified by the bit search algorithm. The major
challenge of this process is to position victim pages to the
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Figure 1: Randomly model bit flipping vs. targeted bit flipping
for quantized ResNet-20 with CIFAR-10.
vulnerable DRAM rows. Prior studies have shown that page
positioning or memory massaging is the most time-consuming
step [13]. To enable fast memory massaging, our attack ex-
ploits a specific kernel data structure: per-cpu pageset,
which is maintained by linux operating system as a fast cache
for recently freed pages. The per-cpu pageset adopts Last-
In-First-Out policy for page allocation. Our attack takes ad-
vantage of the per-cpu pageset for fast release and remap of
of vulnerable physical pages. To induce precise bit flips, we
apply a new data pattern called column-page-stripe to the ag-
gressor and victim pages. Such technique allows the attacker
to induce 1!0 and 0!1 flipping simultaneously in a single
hammering iteration for targeted bits while making sure that
irrelevant bits are kept changed. Moreover, we found that bit
flip profile generated in the profiling stage can be obsolete
after system reboot due to memory scrambling [27]. Interest-
ingly, we observe that memory scrambling merely alternates
the direction of the flip (e.g., from 1!0 to 0!1 ) and does not
change vulnerable bit locations. Based on this observation,
we propose a technique named online memory re-templating
to swiftly correct inconsistent bit flip profile.
5 Flip-aware Vulnerable Bit Search
In this section, we first motivate the need for carefully iden-
tifying vulnerable bits in order to compromise a quantized
network. We perform a robustness study of DNN models by
injecting faults to model weight parameters. Figure 1 shows
the changes of prediction accuracy under two bit flipping
strategies for 8-bit quantized ResNet-20 using the CIFAR10
dataset [28]. As we can see, randomly flipping even 100 bits
in model weights barely degrade the model accuracy to a
noticeable level (i.e., less than 1%). This indicates that quan-
tized DNNs have good tolerance against model bit flips. Note
that most prior successful fault injection techniques based
on rowhammer manifest by only exploiting one or very few
bit flips [9, 13, 48]. Therefore, to practically carry out bit flip
attack in quantized DNNs, the attackers need to find ways to
identify and target the least amount of bits in models that are
most vulnerable. Figure 1 further demonstrates that with our
proposed targeted bit flip scheme (detailed later), attacker can
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Figure 2: Overview of our proposed bit search framework.
considerably disrupt the inference behavior with a very small
number of bit flips.
To attack quantized DNN models, we propose an efficient
flip-aware vulnerable bit search algorithm. Instead of search-
ing all the bits of a network to generate a set of vulnerable
bits, our algorithm utilizes a gradient based ranking to select
top-ranked vulnerable bits 1. The proposed method also con-
siders the feasibility of a certain bit-flip by considering the
memory layout of the model weight parameters.
In order to identify both vulnerable and flippable model
bits, we first need to understand model weight storage and
the corresponding memory layout. In this work, we quna-
tize the weights to 8-bit representations following standard
quantization and representation techniques [71]. Consider a
DNN model with l number of layers, each layer has a weight
tensor containing the weights of that particular layer. Again,
each of those weights would require 8 bits memory space.
Assume that the memory footprint of model weights is M,
and M=T ⇥8 bits, where T is the total number of weight pa-
rameters for a particular DNN. Since weight files are loaded
into memory using multiple physical pages (with typical size
of 4KB), the total number of pages required for a particu-
lar DNN would be M/4096. Inside every page, each weight
parameter has a byte offset (0-4095) and each bit has a bit
offset (0-32767). Since each physical page has a deterministic
DRAM mapping and the location of weak cells in DRAM
modules are mostly fixed, only certain bit offsets (if any)
in any physical page are vulnerable to bit flips. This profile
changes across different DRAM modules (even for devices
from the same vendor). Our flip-aware bit search algorithm
manages to identify a certain highly vulnerable bit and at-
tempt to find a placement of its physical page such that the
targeted vulnerable bit is flippable. The algorithm optimizes
the number of such flippable bits to achieve the attack goal.
At a high level, our algorithm has two major steps: 1) Gradi-
ent based bit ranking which ranks the top vulnerable bits of
1Note that Rakin et al. [44] recently demonstrate a preliminary algorith-
mic work in bit-flip attack to locate vulnerable bits of DNNmodel. It assumes
ideal scenarios where any arbitrary bit in DNN models is flippable, which is
not practical in realistic settings.
weight parameters in a victim DNN model based on gradient;
2) Flip-aware bit search that generates a chain of flippable
bits to target by modeling system constraints based on DRAM
bit flip profile. The overall bit search framework encompasses
several iterations. Each iteration interleaves the two afore-
mentioned steps and involves identifying one model bit to
flip. Our algorithm currently consider flipping only one bit
for each physical page that stores model weights.
Gradient-based bit ranking (GBR): In this step, we create
a ranking of most vulnerable bits in the network based on its
gradient values. Assume that the current iteration is n, we use
{Bˆm}lm=1 to represents the original weights of the target DNN
model in 2’s complement form. Bˆnm denotes the model weights
in the nth iteration (i.e., n 1 bits have already been selected
and flipped). The goal is to find the nth bit to flip on top of
the prior n 1 flips such that the accuracy drop is maximized
in the current iteration. We find the p most vulnerable bits
from Bˆnm in m-th layer through gradient ranking for all the
l layers. With the given input x and target label t , inference
and back-propagation operations are performed to compute
the gradients of bits w.r.t. the inference loss. Then, we select
p vulnerable bits that have top absolute gradient values (i.e.,
∂L/∂b). The top-p vulnerable bits can be defined as:
bˆ
n 1
m = Top
p
    —Bˆn 1m L⇣ f (x;{Bˆn 1m }lm=1), t⌘
     (1)
where {Topp} returns a set of bit offsets of those selected
p vulnerable bits, and f (.) is the inference function of the
DNN. By repeating the above process for all the l layers, we
have a candidate of p⇥ l bits. We then evaluate the potential
loss increment and accuracy degradation caused by flipping
each of those vulnerable bits. The bit that causes maximum
accuracy drop when flipped would be chosen in the current
iteration. The corresponding loss of flipping the ith bit (i=1,2
,..., p⇥l) in the candidate bit set–Lni –can be formulated as:
Lni = L
⇣
f (x;{Bˆn}l⇥pi=1 , t
⌘
(2)
where the only difference between {Bˆn} and {Bˆn 1} are the
additional bit that is currently under test among the p⇥ l bits,
denoted as bˆ
n
. Note that, after the loss and accuracy degra-
dation has been evaluated, GBR will continue to evaluate
the next bit in the candidate. To do so, the bits flipped rep-
resented by bˆ
n
will have to be restored back to its original
state bˆ
n 1 2 {Bˆn 1}. GBR will finally generate a complete
ranking of the p⇥ l bits for the network. The information of
these bits including flip direction, page number, page offset
within the page, test accuracy after flipping are collected and
stored.
Flip-aware bit search (FBS): In this step, we perform flip-
aware bit search to discover a chain of bit flips that can de-
grade the inference accuracy to the desired level on the target
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hardware platform. FBS takes as input the top-ranking vul-
nerable bits identified by GBR. It also requires access to the
DRAM bit flip profile specifying physical page frames and
the page bit offsets where bit flip with certain direction (i.e.,
1!0 or 0!1 ) could be induced. For the current iteration n,
after the GBR step is complete, FBS start to iterate over the
vulnerable bits in a greedy fashion by examining the bit with
highest impact on test accuracy first. Specifically, it refers
to the bit flip profile to check whether there is at least one
available physical page (i.e., DRAM location) where the bit
could be flipped 2. That is, if both the bit offset and flip di-
rection match, this model weight bit is considered flippable
and would be inserted to the targeted bit chain. Otherwise,
this bit is skipped since flipping is not possible in the victim
hardware setting. The algorithm will then move on to analyze
the next vulnerable bit candidate. FBS accumulatively eval-
uates the inference accuracy degradation due to flipping all
bits in the bit chain. If the accuracy drop reaches the attack
objective, the search is complete and the targeted bit chain
will be collected. Otherwise, the selected bit to target in the
nth iteration is bookmarked, and the next iteration begins with
the GBR step that performs gradient ranking again. Figure 2
illustrates the overall mechanism of our bit search framework.
6 Fast and Precise Multi-bit Flips
By running the bit search algorithm as described in Section 5,
the attacker collects one or multiple chains of bits to target
in the victim DNN model. The attacker now needs to prop-
erly locate the corresponding victim pages to the vulnerable
DRAM rows, and precisely induce the desired bit flips. In this
section, we present three novel techniques to enable fast and
precise multi-bit rowhammering. Specifically, in Section 6.1
we introduce a multi-page memory massaging techniques
that exploits CPU local page cache to accurately position the
target victim pages. Section 6.2 illustrates the design of our
precise hammering scheme which ensures only the desired
bits are flipped. We present a online memory re-templating
technique in Section 6.3 that offers fast correction of obsolete
bit flip profile due to memory scrambling.
6.1 Multi-page Memory Massaging
In order to induce bit flips DNN model, memory massaging
is required to map each victim page to a physical page whose
vulnerable bit offset matches the offset of the targeted bit. In
double-sided rowhammer, this includes a pre-step to set some
of the attacker’s pages in three consecutive rows in the same
bank (sandwich layout), and the attacker should be aware of
such memory layout. When the attacker’s memory is properly
situated, the vulnerable page positioning process starts.
2If one physical location has been chosen to flip model bit i, then it could
not be utilized again for model bit j even if both the page bit offset and the
flip direction match.
Massaging pre-step. In order to get the sandwich layout, the
attacker needs to be aware of both DRAM addressing and
the physical addresses of its own pages. Based on our threat
model, we assume that the adversary can not access privileged
system interface including /proc/pid/pagemap for direct
address translation. Our attacker can leverage previously pro-
posed memory manipulating technique to force allocations
of 2MB consecutive memory blocks [30]. Alternatively, the
attacker can allocate a large chunk of memory in user-space,
which will contain multiple sets of physically consecutive
pages with a very high probability. We use row buffer side-
channel as presented in [43] to reverse engineer the DRAM
addressing function. The addressing function maps each page
to one or multiple DRAM location pairs, denoted as (row, set).
The set number uniquely determines the (channel, rank, bank)
combination for a specific physical address.
Once the attacker gains knowledge of its own physical
page layout, the attacker reads the targeted chain of bits to
flip. In our implementation, each targeted bit is represented
as a three-element tuple (vpi, bopi, mode) where vpi is the
targeted victim page, bopi is the targeted bit offset in that
page. Finally mode indicates the desired flip direction and
can be set to 0 (i.e., 1!0 flip) or 1 (i.e., 0!1 flip). In our
attack instance where model weight file is the target, the page
identifier is the serial number of the 4KB content that contains
the targeted weight parameter. The attacker then checks all its
own physical pages and looks for pages that have the targeted
bit locations (i,e., bop). Flipping the targeted chain of bits
is considered plausible with the attacker’s current memory
layout if each targeted page can be positioned and hammered
independently. In case that certain vulnerable pages are not
available, the attacker can verify the satisfiability for the next
candidate set of bits.
6.1.1 Compact Aggressors using in-row Pages
Conventionally, rowhammer attacks use full occupation of the
two aggressor rows. However, preparing full aggressor rows
for each target page unnecessarily wastes page utilization
efficiency, and can also potentially increase the chance of
failure for target page mapping. For instance, let’s assume
that one target page pgid1 needs to be positioned at bank0 and
row10 while another target page pgid2 has be be placed at
bank0 and row11. In this scenario, if we place pgid1 at row10,
row9 and and row11 should be both locked as aggressor rows,
making it impossible to map pgid2 to row11 at the same
time. Since memory-exhaustion can raise alarm for potential
rowhammer exploitation, it is critical for the attack to map
target pages and also limit its memory footprint.
To improve page utilization and maximize chance of suc-
cessful target page mapping, we develop a new rowhammer-
ing technique that creates compact aggressors. Our key ob-
servation is that rowhammering can manifest at finer-grained
level: in-row pages. An in-row page is the portion of a 4KB
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Figure 3: Physical page to row mapping on systems with
two different memory configurations (left: single channel
single DIMM/DDR3-Ivy Bridge; right: dual channel single
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Figure 4: An example of attack memory preparation using
compact aggressors. We illustrate four aggressor sets repre-
sented using different filled patterns.
physical page that is mapped to one row. Figure 3 illustrates
page to row mapping for two different memory configurations.
As we can see, for a single channel single DIMM configu-
ration, one physical page is mapped to one row, and thus
each DRAM row contains two different physical pages. In a
dual-channel memory setting, each page is split evenly to two
in-row pages, and each DRAM row has four in-row pages
(corresponding to four distinct physical pages).
The in-row page is the atomic hammering unit for each vul-
nerable page since other portions of the same page are mapped
to different banks. As long as the in-row page right above
and below the victim in-row page are setup and controlled as
aggressors, the attacker is still able to induce the desired bit
flip. More importantly, it has been observed that the cross-talk
effect to a vulnerable memory cell is only attributed by the
bits in the adjacent rows at the same column. In other words,
different in-row pages can be hammered separately as long
as the aggressor pages and victim pages are set properly. Our
proposed attack leverages compact aggressor to prepare mem-
ory layout for rowhammering. Figure 4 illustrates a possible
combination of aggressor settings considering a 4KB in-row
page size (i.e., configuration in Figure 3a). We can observe
that the victim page in aggressor set1 share the same DRAM
row with the first aggressor in aggressor set2. Additionally,
aggressor set3 and set4 occupies exactly the same consecutive
rows, but they are able to induce bit flips without interference.
Obviously, this approach improves efficiency for page usage
for the target page mapping phase.
6.1.2 Target Page Positioning
With the knowledge of compact aggressors, the attacker’s
next step is to find a mapping of each vulnerable page to
the physical page in its memory space. We utilize a simple
but effective heuristic algorithm that positions target pages
with least number of satisfiable physical locations first. Once
the mapping strategy is finalized, the attacker releases the
corresponding physical pages and remaps the target page.
To accurately locate all the target pages, we take advantage
of per-cpu page frame cache in Linux-based systems. Linux
system uses the buddy system to manage page allocation.
Memories are globally organized as zones by the buddy al-
locator. When a physical page is freed by a process running
on certain CPU, the freed page is not immediately returned to
the global memory pool. Instead, freed pages are pushed to a
local fast page frame named per-cpu pageset. Later when
the OS need to allocate a new page in the same hardware
context, it will first attempt to get the page from the head of
the list (i.e., stack-like access policy). Such design facilitates
usage of pages that are still hot in private caches. Since the
per-cpu page frame cache only manages pages locally, it has
extremely low noise as compared to global memory pools.
Note that When the number of pages frames in the list exceeds
certain recycling threshold, a batch of pages are returned to
the global pool maintained by buddy system.
We exploit per-cpu page frame cache to position the target
pages in the following steps:
Step 1: The attacker determines the target page to exploitable
physical page mapping for the targeted bit chains. Sup-
pose we have K bits to flip, we can denote the mapping as
(pgidi, ppni), where pgidi represent the ith page in DNN’s
model weight memory and ppni is the designated physical
page frame for pgidi. i is within [1, K].
Step 2: The attacker frees the target physical pages ppni from
ppn1 to ppnK in order using the munmap system interface. To
avoid recycling of these pages to global pool, it is preferable
that the number of pages freed (K) should be significantly
less than the recycling threshold. In our testbed, we observe
that the threshold is set to 180 by default, which is sufficient
for our exploitation.
Step 3: Right after step 2, the attacker loads the target pages
of the DNN model using mmap. The pages are loaded from
pgidK to pgid1. To avoid OS page pre-fetching that interrupt
the page mapping, we use fadvise with the FADV_RANDOM
after each mmap call. In the end, each target page is located to
the attacker-controlled physical location.
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6.2 Precise Rowhammering
Once the target pages are placed in the exploitable location,
the attacker begins the initialization phase for the aggressor
sets. Prior works typically uses the row-stripe patterns (i.e.,
1-0-1 and 0-1-0) as they trigger most bit flips. However, on
our platform we figured out that many physical pages exhibit
multiple vulnerable locations (i.e., multiple bit flips). As men-
tioned in Section 5, the attacker needs to control the bit flips
precisely at the targeted locations since extra bit flips under-
mine the effectiveness of our attack. Therefore, the attacker
should avoid simultaneous bit flip at undesired page offsets.
We design a precise rowhammering technique using a new
data pattern called column-page-stripe data pattern. Using
column-page-stripe data pattern, given that the victim row
has bit sequence b0b1...b j ...bk ...bn and assume that the goal
is to flip bit b j and bk , the attacker will set the content of
the two aggressors to b0b1...b j ...bk ...bn. Particularly, we only
configure the stripe pattern for the column where a bit flip is
supposed to happen. For other bits that are expected to stay
unchanged, the bits in its aggressors are kept the same as
those in the victim page. Again, this strategy is built based on
the fact that a bit flip is only controlled by bits in its aggres-
sors that have the same column, and will not be influenced
by the aggressor’s bit values in other columns. With compact
aggressors, the attacker configures the column-page-stripe
pattern with the granularity of in-row page. Otherwise,
6.3 Online Memory Re-templating
Memory templating collects the profile of vulnerable bit loca-
tion in DRAMmodules. The validity of profile is based on the
fact that a considerable amount of the bit flips are repeatable
and stable. Our attack exploits those stable bit flips found in
templating process. However, we observed that even for bit
locations with stable flips, there are times (especially after
system reboots) when our attack failed to toggle the value
in the expected direction (e.g., 1!0). More interestingly, we
found that such bit location almost always allows bit flip in
the opposite direction (e.g., 0!1). Further investigation re-
veals that such phenomenon is related to memory scrambling.
Memory scrambling is done by memory controller to encode
data before they are sent to the DRAM modules [27]. The
encoding scheme is based on a random seed that is set at boot
time. Therefore, when system reboots, the memory controller
may flip the logical representation of a bit to be stored in cer-
tain vulnerable cell. Accordingly, its bit flip orientation would
change. While memory templating has been widely used be-
fore, we are not aware of any prior works that look at this
issue. Note that the obsolescence of template is devastating
for our proposed attack as it requires precise bit flips.
In order to address this problem, we augment the mem-
ory massaging process with an additional step. Specifically,
before the attacker performs vulnerable page mapping (Sec-
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Figure 5: A step-by-step demo of DeepHammer attack.
tion 6.1), it first quickly verifies whether its memory template
has invalid flips for several stably vulnerable memory cells.
This can be done by hammering a few pages in the attacker’s
own memory space. If expected bit flips are seen, the attacker
knows that memory controller most likely has not changed its
scrambling scheme yet, and thus the previous bit flip profile
is still valid. Otherwise, the attack performs fast online mem-
ory re-templating that corrects the bit flip profile. It is worth
noting that a complete templating of the attacker’s memory
space can take up to a few hours. Moreover, we figure out that
complete profiling is not necessary. This is because no matter
what data scrambling policy will be applied, the locations
of the vulnerable memory cells would not change. Based on
this observation, the attacker first filters out pages that do not
have vulnerable bits at the desired locations (according to the
targeted bit chain). This removes vast majority of pages in the
re-templating process. For the rest of the pages, the attacker
only needs to re-test its bit flip direction. Specifically, for each
targeted page offset, the attacker exams its pages that have bit
flips in that specific page offset regardless of whether 0!1 or
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1!0 direction was recorded. The new direction is recorded
and used to determine target page mapping.
6.4 Putting It All Together
By combining all the aforementioned rowhammer techniques,
we build our DeepHammer framework. As a summary, we
illustrate a step-by-step exploitation as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5a shows the process where the attacker prepares com-
pact aggressor layout for all vulnerable pages. In this step,
the attacker takes as input the targeted bits that are generated
from our bit search algorithm as described in Section 5. The
attacker is aware of the pages in its memory space that come
with vulnerable bits at certain page offsets based on the bit
profile. The attacker then prepares a mapping between the tar-
geted pages to its physical pages, which will determine what
page to release later. The attacker uses compact aggressors
to improve memory usage efficiency. If the bit flip profile is
obsolete due to memory scrambling, the attacker then per-
forms a online memory re-templating process (not shown
in this figure). Once vulnerable page to physical page map-
ping is determined and the compact aggressors are set, the
attacker starts releasing the corresponding victim physical
pages by exploiting the per-cpu page frame cache. In this
illustration, the attacker releases the pages in the order: pp1,
pp2, pp3, pp4 where ppi is the desired location to flip bopi
in the target DNN’s memory vpi (Figure 5b). After all target
page frames are pushed to the per-cpu page frame cache, the
attacker immediately loads the targeted victim pages in the
reverse order as shown in Figure 5c: vp4, vp3, vp2, vp1. This
achieves the expected mappings of (vp1, pp1), (vp2, pp2),
(vp3, pp3), (vp4, pp4). Finally, the attack prepares the con-
tent of the aggressors to facilitate precise hammering using
targeted column-page-stripe pattern. As shown in the right
side of Figure 5c, to flip the bit at bit offset bop1 from ‘0’ to
‘1’ in the target page vp1, DeepHammer sets the stripe pattern
1 0 1 only at one column that corresponds to bop1. All the
other columns in the aggressor set is set to x  x  x, which is
a solid pattern that minimize inter-cell disturbances and avoid
extra bit flip. When the aggressor are configured correctly,
DeepHammer starts inducing bit flip at the four locations with
doubled-sided rowhammering. In case that multiple aggres-
sor sets are located in the same rows (maximum 2 for single
channel and 4 for dual channel), DeepHammer can induce
multiple targeted bit flips in one row hammering iteration. For
example, since aggressor set3 and aggressor set4 share the
same rows, DeepHammer only needs to hammer aggressor
set3 because each DRAM access activates an entire row.
7 Experimental Setup
Software setup. Our deep learning platform was Pytorch
1.04 (python 3.6) which supports CUDA 9.0 for GPU acceler-
ation. Our attack is evaluated with both computer vision and
speech recognition applications. For object classification task
in computer vision, several popular visual datasets, includ-
ing Fashion-MNIST [61], CIFAR-10 [28] and ImageNet [11]
are tested. Fashion-MNIST is the only gray-scale dataset we
used, containing 10 classes of fashion dress images divided
into 70k training images and 10k test images. CIFAR-10 con-
tains 60K RGB images in size of 32⇥ 32. We follow the
standard practice where 50K examples are used for training
and the remaining 10K for testing. ImageNet dataset is a
large dataset containing 1.2M training images divided into
1000 distinct classes. Images of size 224 ⇥ 224 are evenly
distributed into 1000 output classes. For Fashion-MNIST, a
simple LeNet [31] architecture was sufficient. For CIFAR-10
we evaluate on VGG-11, VGG-16 [50] ResNet-20 [17] and
AlexNet [29]. For ImageNet classification we used ResNet-
18, ResNet-34, ResNet-50 and memory frugal architecture in-
cluding SqueezeNet [25] and MobileNet-V2 [47]. For speech
recognition application, we test with a popular dataset, i.e.
Google speech command [59] which is used for limited vo-
cabulary speech recognition tasks. It has twelve output classes
of voice command. We test the speech command dataset in
VGG-11 and VGG-13 [50] architectures. For most of other
analysis, we take the popular VGG-16 network [50] as the
base benchmark. It is a 16-layer network among which 13
of them are convolutional networks and 3 fully connected
layers. VGG-16 is a very dense network with close to 138
million parameters. The presence of parameters in heavy fully
connected layers makes VGG-16 a highly dense network. The
details of other architectures are included in the Appendix 11.
Hardware setup. Our DNN models are trained and analyzed
on GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPU platform. The GPU operates
at a clock speed of 1481Mhz with 11GB dedicated memory.
The trained model is deployed on a test-bed machine where
our proposed attack is evaluated. The inference service runs
on a Ivy Bridge-based Intel i7-3770 CPU that supports up
to two memory channels. We have setup two different mem-
ory configurations for the machine. The first one is a single
channel single DIMM setting with one 4GB DDR3 memory
as shown in Figure 3a, and the second configuration features
a dual-channel single DIMM setting with two 4GB DDR3
memory modules.
Memory templating. We used the DRAM addressing
scheme as released in [43]. Using the addressing function,
the attacker perform memory templating by scanning the rows
in the target DRAM modules. Each bank in the DRAM has
32768 rows, and each DRAM DIMM has 16 banks. We ob-
serve that bit flips are uniformly distributed across banks. Our
attack randomly samples rows in each of the bank. It is worth
noting that while templating is an offline process, it is im-
portant that it does not corrupt the system to avoid raising
security alarms. Therefore, the attacker skips rows that are
close to physical pages not belonging to itself.
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Dataset Architecture NetworkParameters
Acc. before
Attack (%)
Random Guess
Acc. (%)
Acc. after
Attack (%)
Min. # of
Ait-flips
Fashion MNIST LeNet 0.65M 90.20 10.00 10.00 3
Google
Speech Command
VGG-11 132M 96.36 8.33 3.43 5VGG-13 133M 96.38 3.25 7
CIFAR-10
ResNet-20 0.27M 90.70
10.00
10.92 21
AlexNet 61M 84.40 10.46 5
VGG-11 132M 89.40 10.27 3
VGG-16 138M 93.24 10.82 13
ImageNet
SqueezeNet 1.2M 57.00
0.10
0.16 18
MobileNet-V2 2.1M 72.01 0.19 2
ResNet-18 11M 69.52 0.19 24
ResNet-34 21M 72.78 0.18 23
ResNet-50 23M 75.562 0.17 23
Table 1: Results of vulnerable bit search on different applications, datasets and DNN architectures.
8 Evaluation
In this section, we present the evaluation results to show the
effectiveness of our proposed DeepHammer attack.
Bit flip profile. To extract most of the bit flips from the tar-
get DRAM module, doubled-sided rowhammering with row-
stripe data pattern (1-0-1 and 0-1-0) are utilized. We first
perform an exhaustive test by hammering rows in all the
banks. We configure the hammering time for each row to be
190ms, which is sufficiently long to induce bit flips in vulner-
able cells. In the memory template phase, we observe 2.2 bit
flips every second. Overall, we found that each bank contains
35K to 47K bit flips. Templating of each bank takes about 5
hours. We further observe that more than 60% of the vulnera-
ble physical pages have at least two flippable memory cells.
This highlights the need to perform precising rowhammering
using our proposed targeted column-page-strip pattern.
Based on our experiment, it takes about 120 seconds for
our flip-aware bit searching algorithm to generate one can-
didate. Note that since bit search can be done offline, it is
not time-critical as compared to the online exploitation phase.
The attacker’s objective is to completely malfunction a well-
trained DNN model, i.e. degrading its inference accuracy to
the level of random guess. Therefore, the ideal attack success-
ful accuracy will be close to (1/# of output classes)⇥100%.
Apparently, the target accuracy after attack would be different
for distinct datasets. For instance, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet
have 10 and 1000 output classes, thus the expected inference
accuracy after attacks would be around 10% and 0.1%, respec-
tively. Table 1 demonstrates the identified bit flips and attack
results if all bits are flipped among 12 different architecture/-
dataset configurations. As shown in the figure, DeepHammer
is able to successful compromise all the networks using maxi-
mum 24 bit flips. We also observe that the required number
of bit flips fluctuates significantly across different architec-
ture/dataset combinations. We note that the vulnerability to
model bit flips can potentially be affected by both network size
and network topology. Specifically, for the CIFAR-10 dataset,
with a larger network size, VGG-16 has demonstrated rela-
tively higher robustness as compared to VGG-11 (13 required
bit flips vs. 3 bit flips). Such observation aligns with previous
studies on adversarial input attack [40] showing potential im-
provement of model robustness with increasing network size.
Additionally, from network topology perspective, the ResNet
architecture family has consistently demonstrated better re-
silience to model bit flips with more than 20 required bits to
successfully compromise these models. We hypothesize that
such characteristic may be due to the existence of the residual
connection in the networks (See Section 9.2). For compact
networks, we observe that MobileNet-V2 is extremely vul-
nerable on the ImageNet dataset where DeepHammer only
need to trigger 2 bit flips to succeed, which is considerably
less than the other compact network, SqueezeNet. Note that
MobileNet-V2 has several distinguishing aspects in terms of
network topology and size: 1) The MobileNet architecture
family is different from the other DNN models with the pres-
ence of the combined depth-wise separable convolution and
point-wise convolution layer; 2) It has deep network architec-
ture with 54 layers while hosting relatively small amount of
model parameters. We envision that network size and topol-
ogy have an interplay in terms of influencing the vulnerability
of DNN models. Finally, besides computer vision application,
DeepHammer is also capable of compromising VGG-11 and
VGG-13 on Google speech command dataset, which reveals
that our proposed attack is effective for a wide range of DNN
models and application domains.
Note that, our searching algorithm could generate multiple
bit chains to attack one network. We reported the minimum
number of bits required in Table 1. Table 2 illustrates three
identified bit chains from our searching algorithm to attack
VGG-16 in CIFAR10 dataset. Due to space limit, more iden-
10
# of Identified chain of bit flips Hammer Accuracy
Bits (page#, bop, mode) time (s) (%)
13 c1: (1,4847,0)!(8,25719,0)!(4,23111,0)!(20,7887,0)!(128,3047,0)!(10,1623,0)!(13,2247,0) 66 10.82
!(2,16447,1)!(9,22079,1)!(356,16823,0)!(60,11655,0)!(3,2087,1)!(3720,29048,0)
c2: (1,11335,0)!(8,223,0)!(28,12567,0)!(7,743,1)!(2,17127,0)!(10,3135,1)!(91,9527,0)!
18 (24,28447,1)!(9,13535,1)!(6,30071,1)!(3720,28728,0)!(15,28431,1)!(460,24375,0)!(154,20671,0) 82 10.70
!(92,32103,0)!(48,12767,1)!(157,15023,0)!(16,27911,1)
c3: (9,12839,0)!(1,9367,0)!(17,9687,0)!(4,20031,0)!(70,17479,0), (25,975,0), (229,9199,0)!
20 (24,31287,0)!(14,11247,0)!(183,5167,0)!(55,12063,0)!(62,9111,0)!(29,25391,0)!(3720,16248,1) 96 10.88
!(2792,1192,0)!(395,30063,0)!(706,4200,1)!(292,19583,0)!(28,21263,0)!(431,20550,1)
Table 2: List of three candidate bit chains (i.e., c1, c2 and c3) to attack VGG16 generated by our flip-aware bit search algorithm.
tified bit chain samples for other network architectures are
shown in Table 4 of Appendix D. We observe that, to com-
pletely compromise the target quantized VGG-16, DeepHam-
mer only needs to attack as few as 13 bits. We also observe
that in terms of bit flip direction (i.e., mode), more than 70%
of the vulnerable bits use 1!0 flip. Such high disparity is
because, in a typical DNN model, vast majority of the weights
are 0s while the non-zero weights play a key role in determin-
ing the classification output. Therefore, to maximize accuracy
drop, modifying non-zero weights at proper locations can
considerably change the prediction behavior.
Another critical observation is that the targeted weight bits
mostly cluster in the first and last a few layers. For instance,
for VGG-16, half of the 13 targeted bit flips (Table 2) are
located in the front-end of the network. Additionally, all the 3
bit flips in VGG-11 network are located in the last 3 layers.
This potentially indicates that the first and last layers of DNN
models are more vulnerable to model weight bit flips. Based
on prior studies and our findings, we believe this is because
perturbations in early stages of DNN can get propagated and
thus amplified significantly towards the end, while on the
other hand, changes of model parameters at the back-end of
the network can directly alter the classification outcome.
DeepHammer online exploitation The online exploitation
phase is implemented as a standalone process. We run Deep-
Hammer to target each of the three bit chains as demonstrated
in Table 2. We observe that in the target page mapping pro-
cess, the exploitable pages found for each bit in the chain are
almost the same, indicating that the offset filtering scheme in
our bit search algorithm is highly effective. In order to find
aggressor sets for all the targeted bits, DeepHammer needs to
allocate a relatively large chunk of memory. Our experiments
show that to satisfy target page mapping for multiple targeted
pages, DeepHammer has to allocate around 12% of the sys-
tem memory. Apparently, the size of allocation depends on
number of desirable bits to flip. Our profiling test shows that
allocation of 20% system memory almost always guarantee
satisfaction of mapping. We note that such memory allocation
can succeed most of the time in the system without triggering
out-of-memory exceptions (unless the available system mem-
ory is extremely low). Additionally, our attack only holds
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Figure 6: DeepHammer re-templating time and multi-bit ham-
mering time for all dataset/architecture combinations.
the memory for target page mapping (the step shown in Fig-
ure 5c). After the mapping is completed, the attacker can then
release the vast majority of memory pages that are not needed
anymore, making it unlikely for system underlying security
policy to raise alarms.
Table 2 also presents the online exploitation performance
for VGG-16 under the three candidate bit chains. For all the
three runs, our proposed attack is able to achieve the goal of
degrading the inference accuracy of the target DNN to about
10%. Due to variations in test dataset, the actual achieved ac-
curacy is slightly higher (e.g., 10.82% for c2). We observe that
DeepHammer can perform target page mapping and precise
rowhammering very fast. All three attack instances requires
less than 100 seconds to induce bit flips. The high attack ef-
ficiency is because DeepHammer uses per-cpu page frame
buffer that allows fast remapping of previously released pages
in a deterministic way. This avoids the process of page relo-
cation that can take substantially longer. We also demonstrate
the time it takes for memory-retemplating in case the bit flip
profile is obsolete. We can see that while memory-templating
can take hours to finish, our online memory-retemplating can
finish in a few minutes. This is because we only need to
check the pages with vulnerable memory cells at the desir-
able locations. Since memory scrambling only changes the
flip direction, but not the vulnerable bit locations, our attack
effectively leverages the vulnerable bit locations in the old
bit profile to filter out most of pages without templating on
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Figure 7: Attack results for DRAMs with different vulner-
ability levels via sampling. The number on top of each bar
denotes the number of bit flips needed for each configuration.
them. Additionally, Figure 6 illustrates the online rowham-
mering time as well as memory re-templating times for all
model and dataset combinations. We observe that all attack
instances can succeed within less than 10 minutes. Overall,
even considering memory re-templating, DeepHammer is still
able to compromise the target quantized DNN in minutes for
the online phase.
Impact of DRAM vulnerability. Our memory templating
phase has identified about 600K bit flips in DRAM module,
which shows that the underlying DRAM modules are highly
vulnerable to rowhammer exploitation. To understand the
impact of DRAM vulnerability on the effectiveness of Deep-
Hammer, we further perform a sensitivity study. Specifically,
as vulnerable bit locations are often uniformly distributed in
DRAMs [13], we randomly sample the bit profile at three dif-
ferent rates (10%: moderate amount of flips, 1% low amount
of flips, 0.1%: rare flips), which matches a wide spectrum
of realistic DRAM vulnerability levels according to prior
study in [54] 3. Note that DeepHammer is designed to work
effectively with partial knowledge of bit flip patterns (e.g.,
number of vulnerable bits in one page) due to the use of the
precise hammering technique that ensures only bits at the
locations the attacker is aware of would be flipped. Figure 7
demonstrates the attack results on 4 different models using
CIFAR-10 dataset. We can see that the attack on AlexNet,
VGG-11 and VGG-16 are successful almost for all cases ex-
cept that the desired accuracy is not reached for VGG-16 at
0.1% sampling rate. Additionally, for ResNet-20, the achieved
accuracy is slightly higher than attack goal under 1% sam-
pling (15.75% vs. 10.00%), and the attack is not successful
under 0.1% sampling. We note that this is because ResNet-20
has smallest network size (See Table 2) with very low number
of physical pages to exploit. Therefore, under less vulnerable
DRAM configurations, the number of bits that can be prac-
tically flipped is heavily constrained by the bit profile in the
3We choose to sample our existing bit profile instead of directly using
existing bit flip database in [54] so that we can empirically demonstrate the
result of the attack.
target system, making it hard for our search algorithm to target
top-ranked model bits. Differently, our investigation shows
that if the system constraint is not modeled, a theoretical at-
tack can succeed using 20 bit flips in ResNet-20. We note
that this highlights the importance of our proposed flip-aware
bit search scheme with respect to understanding empirical
danger of bit fault attacks against DNN in real system.
Impact of single-sided hammering.We also studied the ef-
fect of using single-sided rowhammer that does not require
locating of two aggressor rows. On the same machine, we
figured out that with single-sided rowhammering, much less
vulnerable bits are found (1876 0!1 flips and 1468 1!0
flips). We tested the same 4 models used for the aforemen-
tioned DRAM vulnerability study. We find that results of
DeepHammer using singled-sided hammering is similar to
doubled-sided rowhammering under the lowest vulnerability
level. Specifically, our attack on AlexNet and VGG-11 suc-
ceeded with 7 and 6 bit flips, respectively while the desired
accuracy drop is not achieved for VGG-16 and ResNet-20.
Such results are expected since the number of total exploitable
bits are about 0.3% compared to doubled-sided rowhammer-
ing.
9 Discussion
9.1 Untargeted and Targeted Attacks
DeepHammer mainly focuses on untargeted attacks that de-
grades the overall inference accuracy to the close-to-random-
guess level without explicitly controlling the specific output
class. However, we do have some useful observations that
could lead to a potential targeted attack. Observation-1: The
identified bit-flip chain forces almost all the inputs to be clas-
sified into one particular output group, instead of completely
random, even though the test batch chosen to calculate gradi-
ent is random and may contain inputs from different groups.
We call this particular output as winner-group. Observation-2:
We did not intentionally choose the winner-group in our orig-
inal method, thus DeepHammer does not control the winner-
group directly. However, we find that the winner-group is
heavily dependent on which group of input sample batch is
used to compute the bit gradients. This is likely because our
search algorithm mainly follows the gradient-descend direc-
tion to amplify particular weights that are strongly linked to
one particular output group. Thus, the test data in different
groups may help us find different weights strongly connected
to the corresponding output groups, which could enable con-
trolling of the winner-group by the adversary. These observa-
tions motivate us to find a way of extending our attack to a
variant of targeted attack: forcing DNN to classify any input
to one target group if the attacker can provide one batch of
test data belonging to the target group to our search algorithm.
To validate this targeted attack extension, we test ResNet-
20 on CIFAR 10 dataset. To target class-1, we intentionally
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Architecture: Ori.Acc. (%)
After
Attack Acc. (%)
# of
Bit-Flips
ResNet-20 90.7 10.92 21
ResNet-20⇥2 92.01 14.19 30
Table 3: Ablation study of model redundancy.
choose a test batch with all images from class-1 to perform
our flip-aware bit search. It shows that almost 99.63% of all
test inputs will be classified into class-1 with just 18 bit-flips.
Similar results are observed in all other groups (e.g., class-9
targeted attack requires 19 bit-flips). We will investigate fur-
ther in our future work about other types of targeted attacks,
e.g. only misclassifying certain inputs to specific classes with-
out influencing the rest of inputs.
9.2 Potential Mitigation Techniques
DNN algorithm level mitigation. Prior works have shown
that wide DNNs are typically more robust to noise injection
for adversarial inputs [18, 40]. As DeepHammer can be con-
sidered as one kind of attack that injects noises to network
weights,we expect wider networks could be more resilient to
such attack. To validate this hypothesis, we evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of DeepHammer for both standard ResNet-20 and
double width ReseNet-20⇥2. From Table 3, we can see that
DeepHammer requires higher number of flips as we increase
its network width by 2⇥. In contrast to ResNet-20 baseline
model which requires only 21 flips to reach 10.92 % accuracy,
the ResNet-20 (⇥2) model accuracy degrades to 14.19% even
after 30 flips. Apparently, increasing the network width (i.e.
redundant model) alleviates the effect of DeepHammer (at the
cost of increasing number of network parameters), although
it does not completely thwart DeepHammer. Furthermore,
based on results of different network architectures shown in
Table 1, we find that ResNet family with residual connections
are in general more robust, requiring more number of bit flips,
but still cannot completely defend against DeepHammer. In
complete contrast to other deeper networks which come at the
expense of gradient vanishing [20], ResNet’s residual connec-
tions make the network’s learning process more robust and
resilient.
Protecting top-N vulnerable bits in model. One straightfor-
ward solution is to identify n most vulnerable bits and selec-
tively protect these bits by system software. For example, in
Round-i (Ri), we can apply the proposed GBR algorithm to
identify vulnerable n-bits that degrades the DNN accuracy
close to random guess (10% for CIFAR-10), then those vul-
nerable bits are assumed to be protected by OS and labeled
as bits that cannot be flipped in round-(i+1). Note that we
do not consider the memory layout and flip-aware bit search
to perform this analysis. As shown in Figure 8, we run the
experiments ten rounds, where it does not show significant
Figure 8: Test accuracy versus Number of bit-flips of VGG-16
on CIFAR-10. Curve in darker color indicates later round.
performance degradation of the attack when more bits are
secured.
The above observation clearly shows that the search space
of vulnerable bits is too large. Thus protecting only small
amount of those vulnerable bits may not be a feasible solution.
As a result, defense solutions which provides both software-
and hardware-level guarantee of data integrity may be one
possible direction for future investigation.
Hardware-based protections against model tampering.
Another direction is to leverage hardware support to avoid
data tampering on vulnerable/untrusted memory modules.
Several recent works have studied the use of secure enclave
(e.g., Intel SGX [10]) to protect the privacy of critical data in
DNN such as sensitive user inputs, training data and model
parameters [24,56]. SGX-based solution also offers data in-
tegrity protection against off-chip data tampering. While such
approaches can work on small DNN models, Intel SGX-based
techniques are subject to high performance overhead for main-
taining large models in enclaves [16]. This could pose seri-
ous impact on ML applications that are latency critical. On
the other hand, while many vulnerable bits exist in DNN
model, our investigation has revealed that the identified bits
are mostly concentrated in the first and last a few layers (See
Appendix D). Therefore, securing these vulnerable layers
instead of the entire model may efficiently improve the ro-
bustness of DNN models with low overhead. Particularly,
one promising solution is to selectively preload these criti-
cal model layers onto CPU caches. In this way, even some
bits are corrupted in the DRAM, it will not adversely influ-
ence the inference accuracy of the target model. We note that
there are already commercial-off-the-shelf supports that en-
able allocation of dedicated cache regions to applications for
Quality-of-Service purposes (e.g, Intel CAT [26]). System
administrator can take advantage of this feature to lock vul-
nerable model layers to prevent from tampering while not
incurring considerable runtime overhead.
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9.3 Limitations and Future Work
We note that in our current implementation, we only exploit
a single bit flip in each physical page for our proposed at-
tack. However, it is possible to leverage DRAM pages that
have multiple bit locations in one page. Note that the use of
multi-bit flip in a physical page is beneficial in terms of attack
efficiency. This is because we find that the highly influential
bits in DNNmodels are not distributed uniformly. Particularly,
the first and last a few layers have more vulnerable bits where
many of them are located in the same 4KB page boundary.
Therefore, multiple-bit flip in the same page can reduce the
number of targeted pages as well as the required row hammer-
ing iterations. We plan to explore such optimization in future
work.
Our threat model assumptions are similar to conventional
white-box attack approach in related domain [18, 40]. Under
such assumption, an adversary has access to the network ar-
chitecture, weight values and one batch of test data. While
such information can be potentially gained as discussed in
Section 3, such requirement may not be applicable in all sce-
narios. Nevertheless, to address such limitation, in our future
work, we will explore ways to perform our attack in a semi-
black box setup without knowing the precise weights of a
victim DNN model. Note that architecture information is rel-
atively easier to obtain due to the fact that many applications
directly adapt popular network architectures to do fine-tuning.
Additionally, the adversary could potentially perform this
semi-black box attack by training a substitute model through
label querying of the target model and transferring the attack
from the substitute model to the target model.
10 Related Work
Machine learning have been increasingly adopted in a variety
of application domains [8, 19, 32–35, 49, 58, 60]. Deep neural
work is one of the most promising ML techniques due to its
superior performance. Several recent works have focused on
the vulnerability of DNN models [18, 36, 40]. Traditional se-
curity of DNN mainly focused on the adversarial input attack
where an adversary maliciously perturbed an input image with
an intention to degrade the performance of the DNN [40, 52].
Some of the recent works have shifted the paradigm towards
neural network’s parameters integrity. Inserting hardware tro-
jan and causing networks to behave maliciously has been
effectively demonstrated by few recent works [37,38] as well.
However, attacking neural network weight parameters has
received far less attention.
But recently some of the fault injection attack methods
have demonstrated serious vulnerability in DNN models [5,
36,44]. Fault injection methods have proved to be effective in
completely destroying the functionality of the DNN models.
[36] proposed a single bias attack which changes the value
of a certain bias to an extremely large value to cause the
DNN malfunction. Others have proposed activation level fault
injection [3]. Attacking the DNN weight parameters of a
full precision model through practical row hammer attack is
proposed by [21]. However, attacking a full-precision DNN
is relatively easy than attacking a fixed precision model as
shown by [21, 44]. Thus our proposed DeepHammer work is
the first end to end system level practical attack of fixed point
quantized weights on DNN model.
Several works have been proposed to mitigate rowhammer
attacks. These defense mechanisms attempt to capture/stop
one or multiple necessary steps taken in a rowhammer attack.
Specifically, to avoid fast access to DRAM, some systems
can intentionally disable clflush instructions that allow mem-
ory requests to bypass caches [57]. To prevent memory row
proximity to critical data structure such as kernel space mem-
ory, OS supports are proposed to isolate user-space DRAM
rows from kernel DRAM rows through DRAM partition-
ing [4]. Additionally, many existing rowhammer attacks use
memory spraying in order to force victim pages to vulnera-
ble DRAM locations, this leads to memory exhaustion that
can be detected by system security policies [39]. Hardware-
based protection mechanisms such as Targeted Row Refresh
(TRR) monitors DRAM row access and refreshes a DRAM
row that is potentially under attack [41]. ECC memories can
potentially detect and correct rowhammer-induced bit flips.
However, recent works have demonstrated that bit flips are
still possible even with the presence of such hardware-based
protections [9, 57].
11 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a new class of hardware-based at-
tack called DeepHammer to deplete the intelligence of quan-
tized deep neural networks. Our key observation is that while
single-bit flip attack is effective in degrading the accuracy
for full-precision DNN models, quantized deep neural net-
works are inherently robust to such attacks. DeepHammer
leverages the rowhamer vulnerability to significantly degrade
the inference accuracy of the target model by deterministi-
cally inducing a chain of bit flips in DNN model weights.
We implement a novel flip-aware bit search technique that
is able to locate the least amount of vulnerable bits in the
target DNN models for flipping. We further design several
new rowhammer techniques to enable fast and precise flipping
the the targeted chain of bits. We evaluate DeepHammer on
real system setup and provide an end-to-end demonstration
of the attack. Our evaluation results show that DeepHammer
is able to compromise the target DNN models within minutes.
Our work highlight the need to develop tamper-resistant deep
neural models to tackle future hardware-based fault injection
attacks.
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A Model Quantization Configuration
Weight Quantization. Our deep learning models adopt a
layer-wise N-bits uniform quantizer. For m-th layer, the quan-
tization process from the floating-point baseWfm to its fixed-
point (signed integer) counterpart Wm can be described as:
Dwm =max(Wfm)/(2N 1 1); Wfm 2 Rd (3)
Wm = round(Wfm/Dwm) ·Dwm (4)
here d is the dimension of weight tensor, Dwm is the step size
of weight quantizer. For training the quantized DNN with
non-differential stair-case function (in equation 4), we use the
straight-through estimator as other works [44, 71]
Weight Encoding. The quantized weights are represented as
two’s complement in computing systems. If we consider one
weight element w 2Wm, the conversion from its binary repre-
sentation (b = [bN 1, ...,b0] 2 {0,1}N) in two’s complement
can be expressed as:
w/Dw= g(b) = 2N 1 ·bN 1+
N 2
Â
i=0
2i ·bi (5)
We perform weight quantization during the training for
all the models except 5 architectures listed in Table 1 using
ImageNet dataset. For ImageNet architectures, we use post-
quantization on the pre-trained model.
B DNN Architecture Configuration
For MNIST classification we use simple LeNet [31] archi-
tecture with two convolution layers and two fully-connected
layers. For, VGG-13 and VGG-11 we use conventional archi-
tecture delineated as shown in [50]. Each of the architecture
features three fully-connected layers and remaining convo-
lution networks. Our AlexNet architecture contains five sets
of convolution layers, ReLu and Maxpooling followed by
three dropout and fully-connected layers [53]. Finally, for
ImageNet, we leverage the PyTorch official website’s trained
models in torch vision. For this reason, we quantize the net-
work after training for ImageNet simulation (i.e.,post quanti-
zation).
C DNN Training Configuration
Our training platform is in PyTorch using GPU 1080 Ti plat-
form. For MNIST dataset training, we have the following
configuration: batch size 256, learning rate 0.1 , momentum
0.9, weight decay 3e 4 and SGD optimizer with gamma 0.1.
For CIFAR-10 our training configuration is as follows: learn-
ing rate 0.1, optimizer SGD with 0.1 gamma and momentum
0.9, batch size 128, training epoch 200 and weight decay 3e 4.
For the speech command dataset, we only train the network
for 70 epoch with a 1e 2 weight decay, 1e 4 learning rate
and SGD optimizer with a batch size of 128. For ImageNet
dataset, we directly run the attack on a pre-trained model. We
perform post quantization on a pre-trained torch vision model.
D Targeted Bit-flip Chain for DNN Models
In Table 4, we list the bit chains identified by DeepHammer.
For networks without any residual connections (i.e, VGG and
AlexNet), we observe that most of the bit-flips are located at
the earlier layers, indicating that bit-flip perturbation in the
weight accumulates as it passes through later layers. However,
for ResNet architectures, most bit flips are identified both at
the front and the end of the network. As a result, we conclude
network topology may affect the locations of the vulnerable
model weight bits.
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Dataset Architecture Chain of bits (page#, bop, mode)
F-MNIST LeNet (1,1519,0)!(4,12595,0)!(159,302,1)
Speech VGG-11 (6859,23008,1)!(1,1519,1)!(125,799,0)!(6866,23008,0)!(2533,20816,0)
Speech VGG-13 (1,2007,0)!(6904,25856,1)!(5465,2704,1)!(2155,6424,0)!
(1557,48,0)!(2778,15896,1)!(6914,25856,1)
(66,14055,0)!(4,25639,0)!(1,24399,0)!(9,16175,0)!(5,25047,0)!
CIFAR-10 ResNet-20 (2,29095,0)!(3,32759,0)!(10,9735,0)!(13,9031,0)!(14,25423,0)!
(55,22071,0)!(27,22071,0)!(50,15431,0)!(63,21071,0)!(21,25127,0)!
(12,23863,0)!(18,2215,0)!(39,21935,0)!(45,18655,0)!(48,21047,0)!(51,28719,0)
CIFAR-10 AlexNet (1,4319,0)!(21,4991,0)!(48,32135,0)!(355,1943,0)!(483,11487,0)
CIFAR-10 VGG-11 (591,7848,0)!(316,16407,0)!(111,26153,0)
ImageNet MobileNet-V2 (1,30855,0)!(2,3399,1)
(23,5167,1)!(7,11895,1)!(12,783,0)!(4,30071,0)!(21,26967,0)!
ImageNet SqueezeNet (6,1671,0)!(142,3062,0)!(10,12343,0)!(9,13847,0)!(8,1087,1)
(304,23550,0)!(24,13423,1)!(5,631,0)!(141,10351,0)!
(60,19615,0)!(37,15231,0)!(94,4215,0)!(139,28959,0)
(1,29287,1)!(2,26855,0)!(95,2967,1)!(29,1855,1)!(93,15943,0)!
(9,1167,0)!(22,21791,0)!(31,14535,0)!(1571,16296,0)!(60,25367,0)!
ImageNet ResNet-18 (106,28031,0)!(13,18191,0)!(201,30055,0)!(384,30311,0)!
(134,24983,0)!(52,17543,0)!(2144,13568,0)!(1731,17648,1)!(565,1464,0)!
(268,26823,0)!(45,7295,1)!(931,31968,0)!(9321,7768,0)!(224,22887,0)
(112,5111,0)!(39,3103,0)!(90,23831,0)!(11,1567,0)!(21,4503,0)!(57,983,0)!
ImageNet ResNet-34 (278,7511,0)!(63,1967,0)!(203,4407,0)!(236,20471,0)!(164,23711,0)!(550,30648,0)!
(42,21911,1)!(46,29103,1)!(40,27575,1)!(47,14743,0)!(547,2998,1)!(433,23175,0)!
(26,11647,0)!(66,5015,0)!(798,31536,0)!(111,15863,1)!(28,24495,0)
(20,17911,0)!(62,31870,1)!(118,9342,1)!(16,17503,1)!(60,13438,1)!(379,14207,0)!
ImageNet ResNet-50 (115,23678,1)!(54,17719,0)!(100,25807,0)!(88,19599,0)!(37,17647,0)!(2179,24568,0)!
(2824,14432,0)!(5,31079,0)!(99,16231,0)!(82,13439,0)!(225,10111,0)!(40,7295,1)!
(4,8967,0)!(4757,8592,0)!(9,2455,0)!(2905,22624,0)!(2109,31432,0)
Table 4: Illustrations of identified shortest chains of targeted bits for all DNN models flip-aware bit search algorithm.
19
